Post-quantum migration deadlines · Free
The first binding deadlines have already passed
Every dated post-quantum mandate from 26 jurisdictions, each traced to its primary source. Click a bubble to read the rule, see who it binds, and open the source.
Scroll to zoom · click any bubble for the rule and its source
Where you stand
You have the deadlines. The next question is whether your systems are ready.
Of these 110 deadlines, 38 are binding and 20 are already in force. A date on a map does not tell you what it costs you. The free Post-Quantum Readiness Assessment maps where your own cryptography is exposed and what has to move first, in about ten minutes, with no registration.
Post-Quantum Readiness Assessment
A date on a map does not tell you what it costs you.
24 questions across six dimensions. Maps where your own cryptography is exposed against the deadlines already in law, in about ten minutes. We send you a PDF. No registration, no sales call.
PQC Intelligence
Fourteen migrations. Most of them slightly wrong.
Cloudflare, SWIFT, Google, AWS went first. We read every post-mortem they published, and documented the 28 failure modes they'd rather you didn't notice. Read it before you draft your own plan.
Quantum Threat Scenarios
The machine that breaks your crypto hasn't been built. Probably.
Pick an algorithm. See four illustrative scenarios, set by hand from published estimates and hardware benchmarks, next to the sources behind them.
All 110 deadlines as a table, with every source link
| Deadline | Jurisdiction | Body | Mandate | Enforceability | What it requires | Primary source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 20222022-05-04 | United States | White House | NSM-10 | Binding requirement | National Security Memorandum directing federal PQC migration | bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov → |
| Nov 20222022-11-18 | United States | OMB | M-23-02 | Binding requirement | Agencies must inventory cryptographic systems, report to CISA/OMB | whitehouse.gov → |
| Jun 20232023-06-05 | International | BIS | Project Leap | Official guidance (advisory) | Project Leap: the BIS Innovation Hub and two Eurosystem central banks set up a quantum-safe channel that shields financial data | bis.org → |
| 20242024-01-01 | Global | Browsers | PQC in TLS | De facto standard | Chrome and Firefox ship hybrid PQC key exchange (X25519+ML-KEM) | security.googleblog.com → |
| Feb 20242024-02-20 | Singapore | MAS | Quantum Risk Advisory | Official guidance (advisory) | MAS advises financial institutions on quantum risks | mas.gov.sg → |
| Apr 20242024-04-01 | European Union | Commission | PQC Recommendation | Official guidance (advisory) | EC recommends coordinated PQC implementation roadmaps | eur-lex.europa.eu → |
| Aug 20242024-08-13 | United States | NIST | FIPS 203/204/205 | Technical standard | ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA finalized. The first PQC standards. | nist.gov → |
| 20252025-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | Software/firmware signing & web/cloud: prefer CNSA 2.0 | media.defense.gov → |
| 20252025-01-01 | European Union | ETSI | TS 103 744 | Technical standard | Hybrid classical+PQC key exchange standard | etsi.org → |
| 20252025-01-01 | South Korea | NIS/NSR | KpqC Winners | Technical standard | 4 domestic PQC algorithms selected (HAETAE, AIMer, SMAUG-T, NTRU+) | kpqc.or.kr → |
| 20252025-01-01 | South Korea | MSIT | PQC Master Plan | Official guidance (advisory) | Pilot migrations in finance and telecommunications | quantumcomputingreport.com → |
| Jan 20252025-01-07 | Israel | Bank of Israel | Supervisor of Banks letter (Directive 364) | Binding requirement | Supervisor of Banks letter requires an initial quantum preparedness plan, discussed by the board, within one year | boi.org.il → |
| Jan 20252025-01-17 | European Union | EU | DORA | Binding requirement | ICT risk management for EU financial entities takes effect | eur-lex.europa.eu → |
| Mar 20252025-03-11 | United States | NIST | HQC Selection | Technical standard | HQC selected as backup KEM (code-based, different math family). Standard expected around 2027. | nist.gov → |
| Mandatory Enforcement2025-03-31 | Global (Industry) | PCI Security Standards Council | PCI DSS v4.0 / v4.0.1 - Requirement 4.2.1 | Binding requirement | Certificate/key inventory and crypto-agility controls (Req 4.2.1) become mandatory for all entities that store, process or transmit payment card data worldwide | blog.pcisecuritystandards.org → |
| Apr 20252025-04-08 | Global | OpenSSL | OpenSSL 3.5 | De facto standard | PQC on by default: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA; hybrid TLS. | openssl-library.org → |
| Sep 20252025-09-01 | Canada | CCCS | ITSM.00.501 | Official guidance (advisory) | Recommended contract clauses for buying cryptographic products and services, including PQC | cyber.gc.ca → |
| Sep 20252025-09-18 | United States | NIST | SP 800-227 | Official guidance (advisory) | Key-Encapsulation Mechanism recommendations published | csrc.nist.gov → |
| Sep 20252025-09-25 | International | FS-ISAC | PQC Migration | Official guidance (advisory) | Industry-led PQC migration roadmap for financial services | fsisac.com → |
| Oct 20252025-10-09 | Canada | Treasury Board | PQC SPIN | Binding requirement | Treasury Board SPIN on PQC takes effect: dated migration phases and PQC procurement clauses | canada.ca → |
| Oct 20252025-10-22 | Singapore | CSA | Quantum-Safe Handbook | Official guidance (advisory) | Handbook and readiness index published | csa.gov.sg → |
| Oct 20252025-10-29 | Malaysia | NACSA | PQC Readiness Roadmap | Official guidance (advisory) | National roadmap launched; 2025–2030 migration plan; sandbox | nst.com.my → |
| Nov 20252025-11-20 | United States | DoW | DoW CIO Memo | Binding requirement | Defense components must identify, inventory, and report all cryptographic usage; PSK phase-out by end-2030 | dowcio.war.gov → |
| 20262026-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | Networking equipment: prefer CNSA 2.0 | media.defense.gov → |
| 20262026-01-01 | United States | CISA | Product Advisory | Official guidance (advisory) | Product categories expected to support PQC identified | cisa.gov → |
| 20262026-01-01 | Japan | CRYPTREC/METI | PQC Guidelines | Official guidance (advisory) | Planning into early execution; higher-risk environment upgrades | cryptrec.go.jp → |
| 20262026-01-01 | UAE | Cybersecurity Council | National Encryption Policy | Binding requirement | Binding migration plans; automated crypto inventory; crypto-agility | wam.ae → |
| Jan 20262026-01-07 | Israel | Bank of Israel | Supervisor of Banks letter (Directive 364) | Binding requirement | Initial quantum preparedness plan, discussed by the board, submitted to the Banking Supervision Department | boi.org.il → |
| Jan 20262026-01-13 | G7 | Cyber Expert Group | PQC Roadmap | Official guidance (advisory) | 6-phase PQC roadmap for financial sector | home.treasury.gov → |
| Jan 20262026-01-20 | European Union | Commission | NIS2 PQC (Proposed) | Official guidance (advisory) | PQC requirements proposed for NIS2 implementing acts | digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu → |
| Feb 20262026-02-03 | Hong Kong | HKMA | Quantum Preparedness Index | Official guidance (advisory) | Quantum preparedness assessment index for financial institutions | hkma.gov.hk → |
| Apr 20262026-04-01 | Canada | CCCS | ITSM.40.001 | Binding requirement | Departmental migration plans due; annual reporting begins | cyber.gc.ca → |
| Jun 20262026-06-12 | United States | White House | NSPM-12 | Binding requirement | NSS cybersecurity governance overhauled; CNSS gets binding directive authority; NSA designated National Manager | whitehouse.gov → |
| Jun 20262026-06-22 | United States | White House | EO 14412 | Binding requirement | Key establishment by Dec 31 2030; signatures by Dec 31 2031 for HVAs/high-impact systems. FAR contractor compliance by 2030. CBOM guidance within 270 days | federalregister.gov → |
| Jun 20262026-06-22 | United States | White House | EO 14413 | Binding requirement | QC-ADDS science-grade quantum computer; 3 quantum sensor projects by Sep 2028; supply-chain analysis; NQIAC reconstituted | federalregister.gov → |
| Jun 20262026-06-23 | United States | DoW CIO | DoW PQC Strategy | Binding requirement | All DoW systems: support PQC by Dec 31 2030; use PQC by Dec 31 2031. NSS under CNSA 2.0. Two tracks: HA-ECU and Commercial | dowcio.war.gov → |
| Jun 20262026-06-24 | United States | OMB | M-26-15 | Binding requirement | Five-phase PQC migration (2026–2035). Agency plans due Oct 2026. Crypto-agility mandated | whitehouse.gov → |
| Jul 20262026-07-22 | United States | White House | EO 14412 | Binding requirement | Each agency names its PQC migration lead | federalregister.gov → |
| Sep 20262026-09-21 | United States | NIST | FIPS 140-2 Sunset | Binding requirement | All FIPS 140-2 certificates moved to Historical; FIPS 140-3 required | csrc.nist.gov → |
| Oct 20262026-10-22 | United States | OMB | M-26-15 | Binding requirement | Agency PQC migration plan due to OMB and the National Cyber Director | whitehouse.gov → |
| Late 20262026-12-01 | United States | NIST | FN-DSA (FIPS 206) | Technical standard | FN-DSA (Falcon) standard expected. Compact signatures. | csrc.nist.gov → |
| Dec 20262026-12-19 | United States | White House | EO 14412 | Binding requirement | Proposed FAR rule published, requiring covered contractors to meet NIST FIPS, including PQC, by 31 Dec 2030 | federalregister.gov → |
| End 20262026-12-31 | European Union | NIS Coop. Group | Coordinated Roadmap | Official guidance (advisory) | Phase 1: National strategies, crypto inventories, pilots | digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu → |
| End 20262026-12-31 | Australia | ASD | ISM PQC Guidance | Official guidance (advisory) | Refined transition plan developed | cyber.gov.au → |
| End 20262026-12-31 | Saudi Arabia | SAMA | Circular 482021280 | Binding requirement | Procedures to identify and classify all cryptographic assets complete and accurate | rulebook.sama.gov.sa → |
| End 20262026-12-31 | Germany | BMI, BMDS and BSI | National PQC Guideline | Official guidance (advisory) | Initial preparation and planning phase complete, first migration steps begun, first cryptographic inventory complete | bsi.bund.de → |
| End 20262026-12-31 | Netherlands | Dutch government | Government-wide Quantum Strategy | Official guidance (advisory) | Quantum risk in risk management; own cryptography policy adopted | tweedekamer.nl → |
| 20272027-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | ALL new NSS acquisitions must be CNSA 2.0 compliant | media.defense.gov → |
| 20272027-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | Operating systems: prefer CNSA 2.0 | media.defense.gov → |
| 20272027-01-01 | France | ANSSI | PQC Certification Requirement (2026 update) | Official guidance (advisory) | ANSSI aims to make PQC an obligation for products entering qualification from 2027 | cyber.gouv.fr → |
| Mar 20272027-03-19 | United States | White House | EO 14412 | Binding requirement | Public guidance on the minimum elements of a cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) | federalregister.gov → |
| End Q1 20272027-03-31 | Saudi Arabia | SAMA | Circular 482021280 | Binding requirement | Enterprise quantum risk assessment done, with action plans for the risks found | rulebook.sama.gov.sa → |
| 31 Mar 20272027-03-31 | Singapore | CSA | Quantum-Safe Handbook V1 | Official guidance (advisory) | CII owners submit their quantum-safe migration plan to CSA | csa.gov.sg → |
| FY20262027-03-31 | Japan | Cabinet Secretariat | PQC Interim Summary (Nov 2025) | Official guidance (advisory) | Government PQC migration roadmap drawn up within fiscal year 2026 | cas.go.jp → |
| Apr 20272027-04-01 | Canada | Treasury Board | PQC SPIN | Binding requirement | Departmental PQC migration plan updated for phase 2 (identification) | canada.ca → |
| Mid-20272027-06-30 | Switzerland | FINMA | Guidance 05/2026 | Official guidance (advisory) | PQC roadmap drawn up, based on a strategy adopted by the board | finma.ch → |
| Dec 20272027-12-11 | European Union | EU | Cyber Resilience Act | Binding requirement | Main obligations apply: products need security by design and security updates | digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu → |
| Milestone 1 - Build Foundations (CII)2027-12-31 | India | NQM Task Force | Quantum-Safe Ecosystem Roadmap (DST Report) | Official guidance (advisory) | Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) entities complete foundational PQC governance, crypto-asset inventory and risk assessment | tec.gov.in → |
| Short-term phase2027-12-31 | Taiwan | FSC (Financial Supervisory Commission) | PQC Migration Reference Guide for the Financial Industry | Official guidance (advisory) | Financial institutions establish governance frameworks, inventory methodologies, cryptographic asset inventories (CBOM) and foundational crypto-agility capabilities | fsc.gov.tw → |
| End 20272027-12-31 | Netherlands | Dutch government | Government-wide Quantum Strategy | Official guidance (advisory) | PQC migration plan drawn up, at least in draft; trials for high- and medium-risk use cases prepared or under way | tweedekamer.nl → |
| 20272027-12-31 | Belgium | BIPT | Telecom PQC Roadmap (13 Jan 2026) | Official guidance (advisory) | Assessment: cryptographic inventory and quantum risk assessment finalized | bipt.be → |
| From 1 Jan 20282028-01-01 | Singapore | CSA | Quantum-Safe Handbook V1 | Official guidance (advisory) | New CII systems bought should support quantum-safe algorithms or be quantum-safe ready | csa.gov.sg → |
| Apr 20282028-04-01 | Canada | Treasury Board | PQC SPIN | Binding requirement | Departments begin moving systems to quantum-safe cryptography; high-priority systems identified | canada.ca → |
| End 20282028-12-31 | United Kingdom | NCSC | PQC Migration Timelines | Official guidance (advisory) | Phase 1: Discovery complete. Full inventory and strategy defined. | ncsc.gov.uk → |
| End 20282028-12-31 | Australia | ASD | ISM PQC Guidance | Official guidance (advisory) | Critical systems transition begins (pure PQC, no hybrid) | cyber.gov.au → |
| Milestone 1 - Build Foundations (Enterprises)2028-12-31 | India | NQM Task Force | Quantum-Safe Ecosystem Roadmap (DST Report) | Official guidance (advisory) | Non-CII enterprises complete foundational PQC governance and crypto-asset inventory | tec.gov.in → |
| Milestone 2 - Migrate High-Priority Systems (CII)2028-12-31 | India | NQM Task Force | Quantum-Safe Ecosystem Roadmap (DST Report) | Official guidance (advisory) | CII entities convert PQC pilots into funded migration programs with KPIs for high-priority systems | tec.gov.in → |
| End 20282028-12-31 | Netherlands | Dutch government | Government-wide Quantum Strategy | Official guidance (advisory) | Able to set quantum-safe requirements in procurement and tenders | tweedekamer.nl → |
| 20282028-12-31 | Belgium | BIPT | Telecom PQC Roadmap (13 Jan 2026) | Official guidance (advisory) | Planning: post-quantum migration plans developed and validated | bipt.be → |
| 20292029-01-01 | United States | Internal Target | Vendor target | Full PQC migration including authentication | blog.google → | |
| 20292029-01-01 | United States | Cloudflare | PQC Target | Vendor target | Full post-quantum security including authentication | blog.cloudflare.com → |
| 20292029-01-01 | United States | Microsoft | Quantum Safe Program | Vendor target | Products and services transitioned to PQC (target brought forward from 2033) | microsoft.com → |
| Milestone 3 - Full PQC Adoption (CII)2029-12-31 | India | NQM Task Force | Quantum-Safe Ecosystem Roadmap (DST Report) | Official guidance (advisory) | CII entities complete full adoption of PQC across systems | tec.gov.in → |
| Medium-term phase2029-12-31 | Taiwan | FSC (Financial Supervisory Commission) | PQC Migration Reference Guide for the Financial Industry | Official guidance (advisory) | Financial institutions advance pilot testing, infrastructure upgrades, and joint testing mechanisms | fsc.gov.tw → |
| 20302030-01-01 | United States | NIST | IR 8547 | Official guidance (advisory) | 112-bit-strength quantum-vulnerable algorithms deprecated (RSA-2048, DH-2048, P-224). | nvlpubs.nist.gov → |
| 20302030-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | Networking & firmware: exclusively CNSA 2.0 | media.defense.gov → |
| 20302030-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | Constrained devices, large PKI: prefer CNSA 2.0 | media.defense.gov → |
| 20302030-01-01 | France | ANSSI | PQC Position Paper | Official guidance (advisory) | Hybrid PQC mandatory for KEMs and signatures (EU-aligned) | cyber.gouv.fr → |
| Jan 20302030-01-02 | United States | White House | EO 14306 | Binding requirement | TLS 1.3 (or successor) required across all federal systems | whitehouse.gov → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | European Union | NIS Coop. Group | Coordinated Roadmap | Official guidance (advisory) | Phase 2: CII and high-risk use cases migrated to PQC | digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu → |
| 20302030-12-31 | Germany | BSI | TR-02102-1 | Official guidance (advisory) | Applications with very high protection needs switch to quantum-safe methods | bsi.bund.de → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | Australia | ASD | ISM PQC Guidance | Official guidance (advisory) | Cease use of traditional asymmetric cryptography entirely | cyber.gov.au → |
| Milestone 2 - Migrate High-Priority Systems (Enterprises)2030-12-31 | India | NQM Task Force | Quantum-Safe Ecosystem Roadmap (DST Report) | Official guidance (advisory) | Enterprises convert PQC pilots into funded migration programs with KPIs for high-priority systems | tec.gov.in → |
| After 20302030-12-31 | France | ANSSI | PQC Certification Requirement (2026 update) | Official guidance (advisory) | ANSSI says buying security products without PQC will not be reasonable after 2030 | cyber.gouv.fr → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | Germany | BMI, BMDS and BSI | National PQC Guideline | Official guidance (advisory) | All high-risk applications moved to quantum-safe methods | bsi.bund.de → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | Netherlands | Dutch government | Government-wide Quantum Strategy | Official guidance (advisory) | PQC migration of high-risk use cases complete | tweedekamer.nl → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | Sweden | NCSC | National PQC Recommendations | Official guidance (advisory) | Transition complete for information that stays sensitive for more than ten years | ncsc.se → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | Czech Republic | NÚKIB | Minimum Requirements for Cryptographic Algorithms (Annex) | Official guidance (advisory) | Quantum-safe key establishment complete for critical-confidentiality information | nukib.gov.cz → |
| 20302030-12-31 | Belgium | BIPT | Telecom PQC Roadmap (13 Jan 2026) | Official guidance (advisory) | Implementation: phased roll-out of post-quantum solutions | bipt.be → |
| By 20302030-12-31 | Hong Kong | HKMA | Quantum Preparedness Index results | Official guidance (advisory) | Full sector readiness: a Quantum Preparedness Index score of 10 (it was 2.3 in July 2026) | hkma.gov.hk → |
| End 20302030-12-31 | United States | White House | EO 14412 | Binding requirement | High-value assets and high-impact systems use PQC for key establishment | federalregister.gov → |
| 2031 to 20352031-01-01 | Belgium | BIPT | Telecom PQC Roadmap (13 Jan 2026) | Official guidance (advisory) | BIPT inspects high-risk systems to verify the migration of priority assets | bipt.be → |
| End 20312031-12-31 | United Kingdom | NCSC | PQC Migration Timelines | Official guidance (advisory) | Phase 2: High-priority migration complete | ncsc.gov.uk → |
| 20312031-12-31 | Germany | BSI | TR-02102-1 | Official guidance (advisory) | Classical key agreement on its own is no longer recommended after end 2031 | bsi.bund.de → |
| End 20312031-12-31 | Canada | CCCS | ITSM.40.001 | Binding requirement | High-priority system migration complete | cyber.gc.ca → |
| End 20312031-12-31 | Singapore | CSA | Quantum-Safe Handbook V1 | Official guidance (advisory) | Quantum-safe migration complete across CII systems | csa.gov.sg → |
| End 20312031-12-31 | United States | White House | EO 14412 | Binding requirement | High-value assets and high-impact systems use PQC for digital signatures | federalregister.gov → |
| 20332033-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | Web, cloud, OS, niche, legacy: exclusively CNSA 2.0 or replaced | media.defense.gov → |
| Milestone 3 - Full PQC Adoption (Enterprises)2033-12-31 | India | NQM Task Force | Quantum-Safe Ecosystem Roadmap (DST Report) | Official guidance (advisory) | Enterprises complete full adoption of PQC across systems | tec.gov.in → |
| 20352035-01-01 | United States | NIST | IR 8547 | Official guidance (advisory) | ALL quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms disallowed | nvlpubs.nist.gov → |
| 20352035-01-01 | United States | NSA | CNSA 2.0 | Binding requirement | All US national security systems fully quantum-resistant | media.defense.gov → |
| 20352035-01-01 | Japan | NCO | Interim Report | Official guidance (advisory) | Government agencies must complete PQC transition | cyber.go.jp → |
| 20352035-01-01 | South Korea | MSIT | PQC Master Plan | Official guidance (advisory) | Full PQC rollout across government and industry | quantumcomputingreport.com → |
| End 20352035-12-31 | United Kingdom | NCSC | PQC Migration Timelines | Official guidance (advisory) | Phase 3: Full PQC transition complete | ncsc.gov.uk → |
| End 20352035-12-31 | European Union | NIS Coop. Group | Coordinated Roadmap | Official guidance (advisory) | Phase 3: PQC transition completed for medium-risk use cases, which covers every use case except some low-risk ones | digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu → |
| End 20352035-12-31 | Canada | CCCS | ITSM.40.001 | Binding requirement | Full PQC migration complete | cyber.gc.ca → |
| Medium-to-long-term phase2035-12-31 | Taiwan | FSC (Financial Supervisory Commission) | PQC Migration Reference Guide for the Financial Industry | Official guidance (advisory) | Financial institutions prioritize migration of high-risk and critical systems, and progressively expand migration scenarios | fsc.gov.tw → |
| End 20352035-12-31 | Germany | BMI, BMDS and BSI | National PQC Guideline | Official guidance (advisory) | Migration complete for almost all systems | bsi.bund.de → |
| End 20352035-12-31 | Netherlands | Dutch government | Government-wide Quantum Strategy | Official guidance (advisory) | PQC migration of medium-risk use cases complete | tweedekamer.nl → |
| End 20352035-12-31 | Sweden | NCSC | National PQC Recommendations | Official guidance (advisory) | Whole transition to quantum-safe cryptography complete | ncsc.se → |
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